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  The paper reviews the role of taxation in controlling transport 
externalities. It argues that the design of transport taxes should take into 
account pre-existing tax distortions in the economy and looks at the 
implications of restrictions on the transport instruments at the disposal of 
the policy maker. The relevance of equity considerations for transport 




Data for the European Union show that passenger kilometers driven by 
car were two and a half times larger in 1999 than in 1970, bringing the 
share of car to 79% (versus 74% in 1970). In the US car transport 
accounted for an even larger share of total pkm (84% in 1998). In the case 
of freight transport 75% of total tkm (excl. short sea shipping and air) in 
the EU in 1999 was transported by road, and 30% in the US (European 
Commission, 2001). The large share of the car and truck mode in their 
respective transport markets reflects their qualities such as flexibility and 
comfort. However, when households and firms decide whether or not to 
make a trip, when to make the trip and by which mode and route, they 
take into account only their own costs and benefits. The resulting traffic 
demand is too high in comparison with the social optimum, it is 
                     
1 I am grateful to Kurt Van Dender for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
2 Postdoctoral researcher FWO-Flanders. Address: Naamsestraat 69, 
3000 Leuven, Belgium. E-mail address:  Inge.Mayeres@ 
econ.kuleuven.ac.be.   2
concentrated too much at particular times of day and the share of the 
different modes is suboptimal. This is because each additional transport 
user also generates costs to other transport users and to society in general, 
which he does not or only partially take into account in his decision 
process. The costs that are not taken into account are external costs. The 
main marginal external costs of transport use are congestion, accidents, 
environmental costs and road damage externalities (in the case of heavy 
vehicles). Most of these externalities are characterized by a feedback 
effect: the level of the externality itself affects the behavior of the economic 
agents. This is most evident in the case of congestion and accidents. Time 
costs affect the demand for passenger and freight transport. Similarly, 
accident risks influence transport demand, modal choice, route choice, 
driving behavior and so on. Feedback effects are also present for air 
pollution and noise, since these will lead to aversive or mitigating 
behavior. 
 
The government can make use of several instruments to tackle these 
externalities. Generally speaking, one can make a distinction between 
pricing, regulation and infrastructure policy. This last category is very 
broad. It includes, for example, the expansion of the physical or virtual 
capacity of the infrastructure, but also spatial planning. One instrument 
does not preclude the use of others. They are often complementary. In this 
paper we focus on the role that can be played by pricing.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we briefly discuss the 
characteristics of the marginal external costs of transport. Next, we turn 
to the theoretical prescriptions for pricing. The rules are quite simple in a 
first best world in which the policy maker can make use of perfect 
instruments and when there are no distortions in the rest of the economy. 
They become more complicated when account is taken of features of the 
real world. First we consider how the rules change if there are 
distortionary taxes in the rest of the economy. Next we consider how 
theory can be implemented in the real world. Very often there are 
restrictions on the instruments the government can use. We explore the 
implications of these for the optimal tax rules. Finally, we briefly discuss 
some dimensions of political acceptability.  
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External costs of transport 
 
The marginal external costs of transport use correspond to the costs 
caused by an additional transport user that are not borne by the user 
himself but by others. Transport use causes four main categories of 
externalities: congestion, accidents, environmental costs (including air 
pollution, global warming and noise) and road damage externalities. These 
costs consist not only of costs in the monetary sense, but also of, for 
example, time losses, pollution, noise and so on.  
 
The marginal external congestion costs are present whenever an 
additional vehicle in the transport network reduces the speed of the other 
transport users. A lower speed has several effects. It affects the operating 
costs of the other transport users, and their time costs. Their time costs 
increase not only directly because of lower speed, but also indirectly due to 
schedule adjustment.  
 
The marginal environmental costs include the costs imposed by the 
emission of air pollutants and noise on society in general and on future 
generations (in the case of air pollution and global warming).  
 
The marginal external accident costs are not straightforward to define. 
When an additional vehicle joins the traffic flow, it causes three types of 
costs to society. First, the transport user himself is exposed to an accident 
risk. The social costs of this consist of his own utility loss due to the 
accident risk (which is internal), the so-called pure economic costs 
associated with the accident risk (net output loss, medical costs, police 
costs etc.), and possibly also the utility loss of relatives and friends. 
Secondly, the additional transport user may have an impact on the 
accident risk of the other infrastructure users and therefore on the 
associated costs for society and these other users. Thirdly, other transport 
users will adapt their behavior when confronted with a changed traffic 
situation. These avoidance costs should also be taken into account. How 
much of these three types of costs is external depends on the liability and 
compensation rules that are in vigor, on the type of insurance pricing, etc.  
 
The external road damage costs are discussed extensively in Newbery 
(1988) and Small et al. (1989). They arise when the passage of heavy 
vehicles causes damage to the road surface. Two types can be 
distinguished: the increased repair cost of the road, borne by the road 
infrastructure provider, and the increased vehicle operating costs for the   4
other road users. Under a number of conditions Newbery shows that the 
second type of road damage costs are negligible in all reasonable cases.  
 
The different externalities are not independent. For example, a reduction 
in speed will have an impact on air pollution and accident risk. But the 
externalities are not perfectly correlated. Therefore different instruments 
will be needed to tackle them. Nevertheless, when designing the policy 
instruments account should be taken of the interactions between the 
externalities. 
 
A number of studies have tried to determine the marginal external costs of 
(mainly road) transport use. A selection of recent studies include Small 
and Kazimi (1995), Delucchi (2000), Friedrich and Bickel (2001), Mayeres 
and Van Dender (2001) and Beuthe et al. (2002). The relative importance 
of the different externalities is highly situation dependent. The marginal 
external costs vary widely in respect of the network considered, the 
volume of traffic and the vehicle type. As an illustration Figure 1 gives the 
marginal external costs that are expected to be generated by interregional 
road transport in Belgium in 2005. It shows that in this particular case 
congestion is the dominant external cost category in the peak period. In 
the off-peak period air pollution costs account for the largest share for 
diesel  vehicles. This is due to their relatively high emission of particulate 
matter which is associated with high health costs. For other vehicle types 
accident costs are the most important in the off-peak period. It should be 
noted that the marginal external cost calculations are still subject to many 
uncertainties. Research in this area is continuing and is expected to 
improve the quality of the estimates. 
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Figure 1: Marginal external costs of interregional road transport in 
Belgium in 2005 (business as usual scenario) 
 
PK = peak, OF = off peak, GAS = gasoline car, DIES = diesel car 
Source: Mayeres and Van Dender (2001) 
 




The initial analyses in the transport economics literature of optimal 
pricing of transport were conducted in the first best framework. The first 
best pricing solution in the presence of negative externalities can be traced 
back to Pigou (1920): given the appropriate convexity conditions, an 
efficient allocation of resources can be obtained by setting the price of a 
good for consumption or production according to the marginal costs 
incurred by society. This way the generator of the externality is confronted 
with the damage his consumption or production imposes on others. 
 
In the transport economics literature the first best approach is discussed 
in partial equilibrium models. The main interest is in urban transport and 
the determination of optimal tolls in the presence of congestion. The 
optimal pricing rules are derived by maximizing the net social benefits for 
trips over a road. The result can be summarized as follows: the price of the 
trip must equal its short run marginal social costs. To make each 
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transport user face the marginal social costs of his trip, it is necessary to 
levy a toll equal to the difference between the marginal social cost and the 
average cost that is already borne by the user.  
 
In practice the necessary conditions for the first best rules to be valid are 
not satisfied. The first best analysis assumes that the government is 
concerned with the sole objective of controlling the (congestion) externality 
and that it can make use of perfect instruments. Externality taxes are 
analyzed without taking into account the existence of implementation 
constraints or the presence of distortionary taxes. In reality these 
conditions do not hold. 
 
The implications of pre-existing distortionary taxes 
 
Controlling externalities is not the only objective of the policy-maker. He 
also provides public goods and services – that have to be financed – and 
has distributional objectives. In the first best models it is assumed that 
the government can make use of non-distortionary taxes in order to 
achieve these objectives. A tax is non-distortionary if and only if 
individuals can do nothing to change the tax they have to pay. Taxes for 
which this is not the case are distortionary. Distortionary taxes are not 
efficient: if the government could replace them by non-distortionary taxes 
it could gather the same revenue while at the same time increasing 
welfare. The assumption that the policy maker can make use of non-
distortionary taxes is not realistic. In practice the government has to use 
labor taxes, capital taxes, indirect taxes etc. Therefore one has to develop a 
tax system such that the government’s objectives (revenue raising, 
distributional objectives and tackling the externalities) can be realized at 
the lowest cost. Since transport taxes do not only have an impact on 
external costs but also raise revenue and have an impact on distribution, 
they should be considered within the broader framework of the general tax 
system. 
 
Economic theory tells us what the optimal tax structure should look like in 
this case. Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) give an excellent overview of the 
theory of environmental taxation. Mayeres and Proost (1997) derive 
optimal tax rules for passenger and freight transport in the presence of 
externalities with a feedback effect, in an economy with non-identical 
individuals. It is assumed that the government can make use of indirect 
taxes on the consumption of all commodities (including transport), a tax 
on intermediate inputs in production and of a uniform transfer to   7
households. For simplicity we assume that only transport generates 
externalities. Transport is used both by households and firms. 
 
The indirect tax on the consumption of transport goods then consists of 
two components. The first component is aimed at revenue raising. The 
second component corrects for the external effects. If there are no other 
restrictions on tax instruments, this second part is present only for goods 
causing externalities, in our case transport goods3. Distributional 
considerations play a role in both components. 
 
The first component is related to revenue raising. It makes a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity considerations. This can be illustrated best 
for a special case, namely if the demand for all commodities does not 
depend on the price of other commodities. Assume that the government 
wants to reduce inequality and gives a higher weight to lower income 
groups. In that case this component of the tax will be lower the more 
sensitive transport demand is to price changes (efficiency) and if the 
transport good is consumed proportionally more by lower income groups 
(equity). 
In the more general case when cross-price elasticities are non-zero, 
efficiency requires that the tax is higher for those goods which are more 
complementary with leisure. This is important in the transport pricing 
debate. People travel for different purposes. In general a distinction can be 
made between leisure and commuting trips. If it is possible to tax these 
trips differently, theory suggests that one should tax leisure trips, which 
are complementary with leisure, more than commuting trips, which are 
complementary with labor. The implications of this for pricing have been 
investigated for the special case that commuting is a strict complement to 
labor by Parry and Bento (2001), Calthrop (2001) and Van Dender (2001), 
each using a different model of the transport market and making different 
assumptions about the available policy instruments. In a model with two 
transport modes that simultaneously use a congestible single link network 
in order to produce leisure and commuting trips, Van Dender (2001) shows 
that the welfare cost of uniform taxation on the two trip purposes could be 
important, especially if the labor income tax is constrained to be fixed at 
the reference level and if that reference level is high.  
 
                     
3 This is the so-called additivity property (Sandmo, 1975). Cremer et al. 
(1999) show that this property depends on the assumptions made about 
the feasible tax instruments.   8
The second component of the tax on the consumption of transport goods 
corrects for external effects. It differs from the first best Pigouvian tax in 
several respects. It consists of three parts:  
 
a) a weighted average of the costs that congestion, environmental effects 
and safety effects cause to households, corrected by the marginal cost of 
public funds.  
The marginal cost of public funds is the cost for society of raising one unit 
of government revenue. If the government has to resort to distortionary 
taxes, it costs more than one EURO to raise one EURO of government 
revenue. In that case the marginal cost of public funds is larger than one, 
whereas it equals one in the first best case. This implies that this part of 
the tax becomes lower than the weighted average of the marginal external 
costs for the households. The intuition behind this is as follows. The 
government has several objectives. A higher marginal cost of public funds 
implies that the budgetary objective gets a higher priority and the tackling 
of externalities becomes less important. In order to get as much income as 
possible the externality component for transport should not be set too 
high. This would result in too large a reduction in the demand for 
transport and too little tax revenue.  
Equity considerations play a role in the externality correcting part of the 
tax. Several consumer groups give a different value to a reduction in the 
externalities. For example, empirical studies have shown that the value of 
a marginal time saving in transport or of a reduction in air pollution 
increases as income rises. If only efficiency considerations matter, the 
valuation by different income groups gets the same weight. If the 
government gives more importance to reducing inequality, the valuation 
by the lower income groups gets a higher weight than that of higher 
income groups. As a consequence, this part of the tax will become smaller 
if the lower income groups have a smaller valuation for the reduction in 
the externalities and if they get a higher weight.  
 
b) the marginal external costs for the firms, related to congestion, air 
pollution and accidents 
 
c) the effect of the transport externalities on net government tax revenue: 
the external costs of transport typically influence government tax revenue. 
For example, an increase in congestion will imply that less people will 
travel by car. This results in a reduction in fuel tax income. This is an 
additional cost of congestion. Simulations indicate that this component is 
relatively small in comparison with the direct effects on households and 
firms.    9
 
Theory also shows that if production exhibits constant returns to scale, it 
is not optimal to tax intermediate inputs in production that do not give 
rise to externalities. However, the tax on the input of  transport should be 
positive to correct for the externality. The structure of this externality tax 
is similar to that of the externality correcting part of the indirect tax on 
consumption. 
 
Implementing the theoretical recommendations 
 
Empirical evidence shows that there is a large gap between current 
pricing policies and the recommendations from economic theory (see, for 
example, the overview in De Borger and Proost (2001)). The existing taxes 
are not differentiated in terms of time and place of travel, nor do they 
reflect the difference in air pollution costs between vehicle types, etc. In 
this section we briefly discuss the implications of the theoretical findings 
for transport policy. 
 
Transport use causes different types of externalities, each with its own 
characteristics. The theoretical analysis presented above assumes that one 
can make use of an ideal tax instrument which can address all types of 
externalities simultaneously, and which can therefore be differentiated 
perfectly according to time and place of travel, emission and noise 
characteristics of vehicles, axle weight, driving style etc. Of course this is 
not a realistic assumption. In practice one has to use a combination of 
different instruments, each of which is geared towards solving one 
particular problem. Moreover, also in this framework the perfect 
instruments do not exist and there will be efficiency losses with respect to 
the theoretical optimum. The instruments have to be designed carefully in 
order to minimize these efficiency losses. In what follows we will discuss 
the potential of alternative pricing instruments for tackling each of the 
four main transport externalities. We limit our discussion to road and rail 
transport. 
 
As in the previous section, we focus on pricing instruments. However, this 
does not mean that other types of instruments are not important. The case 
for complementing pricing by other instruments (provision of 
infrastructure, regulation etc.) is strengthened by the existence of 
constraints on the pricing instruments.  
 
Congestion 
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One could choose to control congestion by using existing tax instruments. 
However, as is argued below, this is not the best strategy. More innovative 
instruments are called for.  
 
Taxes on vehicle ownership, though they could play a role in raising 
government revenue, are not well suited for controlling congestion since 
they are not related to vehicle use. Nor do fuel taxes allow for an 
appropriate differentiation according to time and place of travel, since fuel 
consumption is only imperfectly related to the external congestion costs. 
Moreover, fuel taxes can be avoided by fueling abroad (in small countries) 
or by switching to more fuel efficient vehicles which makes them even less 
attractive for a role as congestion solvers (Parry and Small (2001)). The 
switch to more efficient vehicles may also cause an excessive reduction in 
transport related fuel use from the social point of view. It may have a 
beneficial effect on the environment, but at much higher costs than 
alternative measures. Kilometer taxes perform better, but can be expected 
to have only a limited impact on the spatial and temporal distribution of 
traffic, if they are not a function of the timing and location of travel.  
Higher subsidies to public transport are often proposed as a, politically 
more acceptable, alternative for controlling congestion4. Theory shows that 
higher public transport subsidies may have a role to play as a second-best 
instrument if private transport cannot be priced correctly. However, 
progress in road pricing technology does not make this a very realistic 
assumption. Moreover, the potential of the subsidies depends on whether 
they can be expected to have a large impact on modal split. Since the 
cross-price elasticity between public and private transport is quite small, 
the impact on modal split will be relatively small. One also has to take 
into account that financing public transport subsidies may involve large 
welfare costs in an economy with distortionary taxes. Parking fees5 are 
another example of second-best pricing instrument. They are also plagued 
by the problem that they can be related only crudely to the level of 
congestion on the network.  
                     
4 Subsidies can be motivated also because of equity considerations (see 
our discussion below) or because of economies of density which arise when 
public transport companies increase frequency in response to higher 
transport demand, thereby reducing costs for existing public transport 
users. 
5 Parking charges also pop up in the transport pricing debate for another 
reason. Currently a large group of car users are not charged for the 
resource costs of parking. Studies show that making them pay these costs 
may have important welfare effects (Calthrop et al. (2000)).    11
 
The conclusion we can draw from this discussion is that congestion is 
addressed best by a type of road pricing. Several types of road pricing can 
be envisaged. The easiest and cheapest to implement are systems such as 
pay lanes, area licensing and cordon pricing. In the first system one of 
several highway lanes is tolled while the other lanes are not. It can 
improve efficiency by sorting drivers according to their value of time. Area 
licensing requires a license to drive in certain areas, possibly at certain 
times of day. Highway vignettes for trucks are an example of this system, 
though usually not incorporating a time restriction. In urban areas area 
licensing usually concerns highly congested zones, which makes it more 
efficient in tackling congestion. With cordon pricing all vehicles entering 
the area within the cordon are charged a toll which could be differentiated 
according to time of day.  
More sophisticated systems include a form of electronic road pricing, using 
automatic vehicle identification or smart-cards. The disadvantage of the 
first system is that it can be considered as an obstacle to individual 
privacy. This problem is overcome in the case of smart-cards. Systems 
using electronic road pricing offer more possibilities to charge a price in 
function of the traffic situation, and therefore allow to come closer to the 
theoretically optimal situation.  
 
Due to political and technological reasons it is likely that the reform of 
transport prices will be implemented gradually. In the short run road 
pricing will most likely involve only parts of the network, rather than the 
whole network. This entails efficiency losses. When setting the second-best 
tolls on the tolled lanes or links in the network one needs to take into 
account the fact that other lanes/links remain untolled, in order to 
minimize the efficiency losses. Quite a number of studies have analyzed 
second-best tolls when there are restrictions on the tolling instrument. A 
good overview is given in Lindsey and Verhoef (2001). De Borger and 
Proost (2001) use the TRENEN model to determine the relative efficiency 
of various pricing measures for different cities (Brussels, Amsterdam, 
London, Dublin) and countries (Belgium, Ireland). It is shown that by 
increasing fuel prices one cannot achieve a lot. The welfare gain ranges 
from 5.7% to 21% of the first best outcome, depending on the severity of 
the congestion problem. In urban areas cordon pricing in combination with 
parking charges achieves up to 77% of the first best outcome. The 
potential of these measures depends on the size of the area, the number of 
cordons and the extent to which parking is underpriced. For non-urban 
transport in Belgium optimal highway tolls in combination with optimal 
public transport prices can achieve more than 80% of the first best welfare   12
gain. Similar results are obtained by Parry (2000) who compares the 
efficiency of various instruments for congestion control. The efficiency 
gains that can be obtained by transit fare subsidies, gasoline taxes and 
single lane tolls are shown to be very limited in comparison with a 
congestion tax. He also finds that, although with heterogeneous transport 
users the optimal congestion tax requires a different toll on fast and slow 
lanes in order to sort out drivers with different values of time, the 
additional benefit of a differentiated toll over a toll that is uniform across 




A kilometer tax that can be differentiated in terms of pollution 
characteristics performs relatively well in tackling the environmental 
externalities of transport use. So does the fuel tax for certain types of 
emissions that are directly related to fuel consumption, such as CO2, since 
the fuel tax can be differentiated according to the fuel used and its quality. 
However, it cannot make a distinction between different vehicle types. 
Taxes on vehicle ownership can play a role since they can be differentiated 
according to vehicle type. They are easy to implement and a good source of 
government revenue. Mayeres and Proost (2001a) argue that since fuel 
taxes do not allow to make a distinction according to who uses the fuel 
(cars versus trucks, vehicles with different emission technology, use for 
professional versus private purposes) and since fuel tourism occurs, 
especially in small countries, there is a role for vehicle ownership taxes. 
De Borger (2001) derives optimal rules for the taxation of car ownership 
and car use in the presence of externalities. His analysis shows that, when 
there are no restrictions on tax instruments, fixed taxes mainly play a role 
in raising revenue, rather than correcting for external costs. However, 
when there are restrictions on tax instruments, the fixed tax structure 
becomes crucial to respond to external cost differences between vehicle 
types. The tax differential between two vehicle types is then shown to be a 
complex function of the relationship between variable taxes and marginal 
external costs and of the various price elasticities that determine the 
budgetary implications of tax adjustments. Fullerton and West (2000) 
investigate the extent to which the optimal Pigouvian pollution tax can be 
mimicked by a tax on fuel and on car characteristics such as engine size, 
vintage, or the absence of pollution control equipment. They find that 71% 
of the welfare gain under the Pigouvian tax can be realized with a 
combined tax on size, fuel and vintage; 62% is obtainable via a fuel tax 
alone. 
   13
Safety 
 
Reducing accident externalities relies first of all on the use of liability and 
compensation rules. With risk aversion, insurance comes into play. A 
careful design of insurance premia is probably the most efficient pricing 
instrument to internalize the external cost of accidents (see, for example, 
Boyer and Dionne (1987)). This requires a sophisticated structure of 
premia with full differentiation according to risk category and 
incorporating all variable accident cost components.  
 
Road damage externalities 
 
Road damage caused by vehicles depends on the vehicle weight per axle. 
The introduction of a kilometer charge that is a function of the number of 
equivalent standard axle loads of a heavy vehicle is  efficient in reducing 
this type of externality. A tax that is closely linked to the road damage 
caused by vehicles would give truckers an incentive to reduce axle weights 
(see Small et al. (1989)). Fuel taxes are less appropriate in this case since 
they give truckers the opposite incentive, given that fuel use increases 
with the number of axles. 
   14
Political acceptability 
 
Although economists have been advocating better transport pricing for a 
long time, the number of schemes that have been implemented in practice 
is very limited (see Small and Gomez-Ibanez, 1998). Public resistance to 
these new pricing schemes is large. The uncertainty about the 
distributional impacts of the pricing reforms is one of the main 
impediments to their implementation.  
 
A number of studies have analyzed the distributional impacts of transport 
price reforms6. A prerequisite for the evaluation of the equity impacts is 
that transport instruments are not considered in isolation, but that the 
rest of the tax system is also taken into account. This implies the use of a 
general equilibrium approach is more appropriate for the evaluation than 
a partial equilibrium approach. The simulation results of Mayeres and 
Proost (1997, 2001b) and Mayeres (2001) show that equity considerations 
do not have a large impact on the ranking of transport instruments. For 
example, road pricing  continues to be preferred to the fuel tax and higher 
subsidies to public transport. However, when society becomes more 
inequality averse, this has a significant impact on the choice of the 
revenue preserving strategies. While in the pure efficiency case the 
revenues of peak road pricing are best used to reduce the labor income tax, 
an increase in social security transfers is preferred with higher degrees of 
inequality aversion. An important implication of the analysis is that the 
revenue-preserving strategies cannot be ignored in the design of transport 
policies and that they can play a significant role in enhancing their 




Economic analysis shows that significant welfare gains can be obtained by 
changing transport prices such that they are a better reflection of the 
marginal social costs of transport. Since transport demand is expected to 
grow further, the need for better transport pricing will only be increased in 
the future. This paper has explored some dimensions related to the 
implementation of the theoretical recommendations in the real world. It 
argues that the design of new pricing schemes should take into account 
                     
6 see for example, Small (1983), Arnott et al. (1994), Mayeres and Proost 
(1997, 2001b) and Mayeres (2001)). A recent review of the key issues in 
this literature is given by Richardson and Chang-Hee (1998).   15
the existence of other distortions in the economy and of constraints on the 
available policy instruments. These pricing schemes currently are not very 
popular. Careful design of the revenue recycling strategies could help to 




Arnott, R., A. De Palma and R. Lindsey 1994. “The Welfare Effects of 
Congestion Tolls with Heterogeneous Commuters”. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. 28, pp. 139-161. 
 
Boyer, M. and G. Dionne 1987. “The Economics of Road Safety”. 
Transportation Research B. 21, pp. 413-431. 
 
Beuthe, M., F. Degrandsart, J.-F. Geerts and B. Jourquin 2002. “External 
Costs of the Belgian Interurban Freight Traffic: A Network Analysis of 
their Internalisation”. Transportation Research D. 7, pp. 285-301. 
 
Bovenberg, A.L. and L.H. Goulder 2002. “Environmental Taxation and 
Regulation.” In: Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3. Eds. A.J. 
Auerbach and M. Feldstein. North-Holland. 
 
Calthrop, E., S. Proost and K. Van Dender 2000. “Parking Policies and 
Road Pricing”. Urban Studies. 37, pp. 63-76. 
 
Calthrop, E. 2001. On Subsidising Auto Commuting. ETE Discussion 
Paper 2001-13. Leuven: Centre for Economic Studies,  K.U.Leuven. 
  
Cremer, H., F. Gahvari and N Ladoux 1999. “Externalities and Optimal 
Taxation”. Journal of Public Economics. 70, pp. 343-364. 
 
De Borger, B. 2001. “Discrete Choice Models and Optimal Two-Part 
Tariffs in the Presence of Externalities: Optimal Taxation of Cars". 
Regional Science and Urban Economics. 31, pp. 471-504. 
 
De Borger, B. and S. Proost (eds.) 2001. Reforming Transport Pricing in 
the European Union. A Modelling Approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Delucchi, M.A. 2000. “Environmental Externalities of Motor-Vehicle Use 
in the US”. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. 34, pp. 135-168. 
   16
European Commission 2001. European Union Energy and Transport in 
Figures. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate General for Energy 
and Transport.  
 
Friedrich, R. and P. Bickel (eds.) 2001. Environmental External Costs of 
Transport. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Fullerton, D. and S.E. West 2002. “Can Taxes on Cars and Gasoline Mimic 
an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management. 43, pp. 135-157. 
 
Lindsey, R. and E. Verhoef 2001. “Traffic Congestion and Congestion 
Pricing”. In: Handbook of Transport Systems and Traffic Control. Eds. 
K.J. Button and D.A. Hensher. Amsterdam: Pergamon, pp. 77-105. 
 
Mayeres, I. and S. Proost 1997. “Optimal Tax and Public Investment 
Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities”. Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics. 99, pp. 261-279.  
 
Mayeres, I. 2001. Equity and Transport Policy Reform. ETE Discussion 
Paper 2001-14, Centre for Economic Studies, K.U.Leuven.  
 
Mayeres, I. and S. Proost 2001a. “Should Diesel Cars in Europe be 
Discouraged?”. Regional Science and Urban Economics. 31, pp. 453-470. 
 
Mayeres, I. and S. Proost 2001b. “Marginal Tax Reform, Externalities and 
Income Distribution”. Journal of Public Economics. 79, pp. 343-363. 
 
Mayeres, I. and K. Van Dender 2001, “The External Costs of Transport”. 
In: Reforming Transport Pricing in the European Union. A Modelling 
Approach. Eds. B. De Borger and S. Proost. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Newbery, D. 1988. “Road User Charges in Britain”. The Economic Journal. 
98, pp. 161-176. 
 
Parry, I.W.H. 2000. Comparing the Efficiency of Alternative Policies for 
Reducing Traffic Congestion. RFF Discussion Paper 00-28. Washington: 
Resources for the Future. 
 
Parry, I.W.H. and A. Bento 2001. “Revenue Recycling and the Welfare 
Effects of Road Pricing”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 103, pp. 645-
671.   17
 
Parry, I.W.H. and K. Small 2001. Does Britain or the United States Have 
the Right Gasoline Tax?. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
 
Pigou, A.C. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan. 
 
Richardson, H.W. and C.B. Chang-Hee 1998. “The Equity Impacts of Road 
Congestion Pricing”. In: Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the 
Environment. Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility. Eds. K.J. Button 
and E. Verhoef. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 247-262. 
 
Sandmo, A. 1975. “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities”. 
Swedish Journal of Economics. 77, pp. 86-98. 
 
Small, K. 1983. “The Incidence of Congestion Tolls on Urban Highways”. 
Journal of Urban Economics. 13, pp. 90-111. 
 
Small, K.A. and J.A. Gomez-Ibanez 1998. “Road Pricing for Congestion 
Management”. In: Road Pricing, Traffic Congestion and the Environment. 
Issues of Efficiency and Social Feasibility. Eds. K.J. Button and E. 
Verhoef. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Small, K. and C. Kazimi 1995. “On the Costs of Air Pollution from Motor 
Vehicles”. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. pp. 7-32. 
 
Small, K.A., C. Winston and C.A. Evans 1989. Road Work: A New 
Highway Pricing and Investment Policy. Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution. 
 
Van Dender, K. 2001. Transport Taxes with Different Trip Purposes. ETE 
Discussion Paper 2001-17, Centre for Economic Studies, K.U.Leuven.  
    





The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division of 
the Department of Economics of the Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven. The CES research department employs some 100 people. 
The division Energy, Transport & Environment (ETE) currently 
consists of about 15 full time researchers. The general aim of ETE 
is to apply state of the art economic theory to current policy 
issues at the Flemish, Belgian and European level. An important 
asset of ETE is its extensive portfolio of numerical partial and 
general equilibrium models for the assessment of transport, 
energy and environmental policies. 
 
  WORKING PAPER SERIES 
n° 2002-11  Mayeres, I. (2002), Taxes and Transport Externalities 
n° 2002-10  Franckx, L. and Kampas, A. (2002), A Note on “The Choice between 
Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring” 
n° 2002-09  Eyckmans, J. (2002) International Environment Agreements And  
The Case Of Global Warming 
n° 2002-08  Calthrop, E. Proost, S. (2002) Environmental Pricing in Transport  
Chapter for Handbook 4: Transport and the Environment 
n° 2002-07  De Borger, B. and Van Dender, K. (2002), Transport tax reform, 
commuting and endogenous values of time 
n° 2002-06  Franckx, L. and d’Amato, A. (2002), Multiple-task common agency with  
one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy 
n° 2002-05  Moons, E. (2002), Cost- benefit analysis of the location of new forest 
land 
n° 2002-04  Rousseau, S. and Proost, S. (2002), The Cost Effectiveness of 
Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect 
Compliance 
n° 2002-03  Calthrop, E. (2002), Evaluating on-street parking policy 
n° 2002-02  Calthrop, E., and Proost, S. (2002), Regulating on-street parking 
n° 2002-01  Franckx, L. (2002), Penalty and crime with lumpy choices: some further 
considerations 
N° 2001-26  Rousseau, S. (2001), Effluent trading to improve water quality: what do 
we know today? 
n° 2001-25  Degraeve, Z., Proost, S. and Wuyts, G. (2001), Cost-efficiency 
methodology for the selection of new car emission standards in 
Europe 
n° 2001-24  Bigano, A. (2001), Environmental Dumping, Transboundary Pollution  
And Asymmetric Information  Some Insights For The 
Environmental Regulation Of The European Electricity Market 
n° 2001-23  Mayeres, I., and Proost, S. (2001), Can we use transport accounts for 
pricing policy and distributional analysis? 
n° 2001-22  Moons, E., Loomis, J., Proost, S., Eggermont, K. and Hermy, M. (2001), 
Travel cost and time measurement in travel cost models 
n° 2001-21  Calthrop, E. (2001), Pricing a stock-constrained congestible facility 